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Abstract
How should monetary policy be constructed when national income depends on
oil exports? I set up a general equilibrium model for an oil exporting small open
economy to analyze this question. Fundamentals include an oil sector and domestic
non-oil firms – some of which are linked to oil markets via supply chains. In the
model, the intermediate production network implies transmission of international
oil shocks to all domestic industries. The presence of wage and price rigidities
at the sector level leads to non-trivial trade-offs between different stabilization tar-
gets. I characterize Ramsey-optimal monetary policy in this environment, and use
the framework to shed light on i) welfare implications of the supply chain channel,
and ii) costs of alternative policy rules. Three results emerge: First, optimal policy
puts high weight on nominal wage stability. In contrast, attempts to target impulses
from the oil sector can be disastrous for welfare. Second, while oil sector activities
contribute to macroeconomic fluctuations, they do not change the nature of optimal
policy. Third, operational Taylor rules with high interest rate inertia can approximate
the Ramsey equilibrium reasonably well.
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“Norges Bank’s conduct of monetary policy is geared towards low and
stable inflation. ... When setting the key policy rate, we also take into account
the impact of the interest rate on output and employment. ... Our frame-
work has still not been tested against a large and persistent negative oil price
shock. From a high starting point, wages have grown faster in Norway than
among our trading partners for the past ten years. Our currency has appre-
ciated considerably in real terms. I believe the real test of our framework will
come when the present boom in the petroleum industry – at some point – is
reversed.”
Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank, 19 November 2012
1 INTRODUCTION
The economic forces inherent in resource rich economies represent particular challenges
for stabilization policy. Commodity prices, which are volatile time series processes, in-
fluence both exchange rates and the terms of trade of commodity exporters. In turn, these
impulses map into price and quantity movements in labor and product markets outside
the commodity sector – both along extensive margins and in form of sectoral realloca-
tions. The spillover from commodity markets can be substantial. Norway, a petroleum
rich small open economy, serves as a prime example. Even though all oil and gas rev-
enues are saved abroad and only about 4% of the fund is spent each year, Bjørnland and
Thorsrud (2013) find that movements in the petroleum sector explain about 30% of the
medium term fluctuations in mainland (non-oil) GDP. It is, therefore, not surprising that
policy makers and market participants have raised concerns regarding spillover from the
petroleum sector, and the room for policy.
What are the implications, if any, of commodity exports for optimal policy design?
This paper analyzes monetary policy in an economy with a large oil sector. I set up a
New Keynesian model where the oil sector exists side by side with domestic traded and
non-traded firms. Oil market shocks, as well as domestic and foreign productivity, create
macroeconomic fluctuations in the economy. A key feature of the model is a supply chain
where firms in the oil sector buy productive inputs from the non-oil economy. The supply
chain gives rise to spillover from the oil sector in a way that limits the scope for fiscal
insulation policies.1 In the model, a rise in oil sector activity induces higher demand for
oil inputs. In turn, this affects labor markets across the entire economy, because labor is
an important ingredient in the production of inputs supplied to the oil sector. This im-
plies that oil shocks are responsible for fluctuations in the non-oil economy even without
spending of oil revenues. The impulses through the supply chain can be large and volatile,
as international data on commodity prices suggest. To provide a role for monetary policy,
I introduce monopolistic competition as well as nominal wage and price rigidity in labor
and goods markets. These frictions generate time varying deviations from optimal capac-
ity utilization. The question then is how, and to what extent, the use of active monetary
policy can mitigate resulting inefficiencies.
1E.g. sovereign wealth funds and public spending rules.
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I analyze Ramsey optimal monetary policy in this environment, and contrast optimal
responses with those that follow from an interest rate rule designed to fit data. Following
a boom in the oil sector, the frictions in the model prevent sufficient real wage growth
and exchange rate appreciation on the one side, but create too much expansion in non-
oil GDP and hours worked on the other. The combination of limited real wage growth
and substantial increase in hours gives rise to nominal wage inflation, causing inefficient
wage dispersion in the non-oil economy. Consequently, optimal policy assigns a relatively
large weight to nominal wage stability. How is this achieved? During an oil boom, the
Ramsey planner responds with an aggressive increase in the policy rate. This amplifies the
appreciation of exchange rates. In turn, the appreciation brings down import prices and the
consumer price index. The gain of low prices is real wage growth even without substantial
nominal wage inflation. Thus, optimal policy prevents most of the cross-sectional wage
dispersion caused by a boom in the oil sector. Regarding optimal responses to domestic
and foreign non-oil shocks, wage stability turns out to be important also for these shocks.
At this point, a number of questions arise that are relevant for policy making in prac-
tice. To what extent should monetary authorities care about spillover from the oil sector?
What are the implications of alternative stabilization targets such as a fixed exchange rate?
How well can one approximate Ramsey optimal policy by an operational targeting rule?
I tackle these questions by quantifying the welfare losses associated with a large set of
alternative stabilization targets. In contrast to suggestions put forward in the literature
(Frankel, 2003, 2011; Cata˜o and Chang, 2013), I find that stabilizing price impulses from
the oil sector (or equivalently, stabilizing the local currency export price) is disastrous
from a welfare perspective. Intuitively, such a policy i) amplifies the oil sector demand to-
wards non-oil firms, and ii) requires enormous nominal and real interest rate movements.
In turn, these features lead to excessive volatility in the domestic non-oil economy. This
is true both with strict and flexible targeting rules. The analysis also reveal that wage sta-
bility is optimal even in the absence of oil, confirming Campolmi (2014). In fact, while
differences in welfare across policies can be mounting, they are generally not much af-
fected by the size of the oil sector. Finally I study a set of optimized, flexible targeting
rules. It is found that rules involving high interest rate inertia and combinations of wage
and consumer price targeting can approximate Ramsey optimal policy reasonably well.
Recent swings in international commodity prices have inspired renewed interest in
how commodity exporters should conduct policy. Pieschacon (2012) investigates fiscal
spending plans through the lenses of a real business cycle model, and concludes that
insulation of the economy from oil price shocks is welfare improving. However, the
analysis abstracts from the supply chain channel linking non-oil firms directly to the oil
sector. It is exactly this transmission channel that makes the insulation of oil price shocks
inferior to other policies in my framework. Probably the most closely related papers
are Hevia and Nicolini (2013) and Cata˜o and Chang (2013). The former study looks at
Ramsey optimal combinations of fiscal and monetary policy, where the social planner
has access to a wide set of taxes and transfers in addition to the policy rate. Cata˜o and
Chang (2013) analyze an arguably more realistic environment without extensive fiscal-
monetary coordination. Both of these studies point to welfare gains if the central bank
targets producer prices, although Cata˜o and Chang (2013) find that exchange rate stability
is preferred if trade elasticities are high. An important assumption in these models is that
domestic non-oil firms use oil as intermediate input in production. In contrast, I propose
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that oil production requires non-oil inputs, i.e. that flows in the supply chain go the other
way. This departure from previous literature is crucial for policy: Non-oil firms in existing
models see oil prices movements as cost-push shocks, instead of demand shocks as in my
framework. The positive spillover from oil to non-oil firms found in data (see Bjørnland
and Thorsrud (2013)) supports the latter view. I also use a richer model with labor market
frictions, sectoral reallocations, and joint determination of oil prices and other foreign
variables. All these features are relevant for the description of optimal policy.2
I make two contributions to existing literature: First, the model I present here is tai-
lored to describe dynamics in an oil exporting small open economy, and advances the
traditional one- or two-sector setup. In particular, it can account for the positive spillover
from the oil sector to non-oil GDP and other macro-variables found in empirical literature
(see e.g. Charnavoki and Dolado (2014) and Bjørnland and Thorsrud (2013)). In existing
DSGE models on the other hand, a boom in the oil sector constrains factor markets and
crowds out non-oil activity. Consistent with data, the model also generates real apprecia-
tion of local currency, substantial terms of trade improvements, and a fall in non-oil trade
balances. Second, the analysis sheds light on the welfare implications of monetary policy
in this environment. An important point in that respect is that any attempts at stabilizing
impulses from the oil sector, comes at the cost of producing volatility somewhere else.
This leads to a trade-off which complicates the task of monetary authorities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I present a two-country,
three-sector small open economy model similar in spirit to those developed by Petrella
and Santoro (2011) and Bergholt and Sveen (2014), but extended with an oil exporting
sector in the home economy. Section 3 presents the Ramsey optimal monetary policy, and
contrasts implied dynamics with a more standard Taylor rule for the interest rate. I pay
particular attention to the way in which optimal policy is achieved by the central bank.
Welfare implications of alternative rules are analyzed in section 4. I study strict stabi-
lization rules, simple Taylor type rules, and optimized flexible inflation targets. Section 5
presents a battery of robustness tests while section 6 concludes.
2 THE MODEL
Consider a world with two economies – a small commodity exporting economy (SOE)
and the rest of the world (ROW). The SOE consists of three production sectors. The
first two are so called non-commodity sectors – I refer to them as the manufacturing and
service sector, respectively.3 Firms in these sectors produce consumption goods, which
they sell to households, and production inputs, which they sell to other firms. Some of
the output is sold in domestic markets, some is exported to the ROW. The third sector in
the SOE specializes in commodity exports – I refer to it as the oil sector. Firms in the oil
sector use labor and intermediate inputs (produced by non-oil firms) in order to produce
and supply oil in an international, competitive oil market. The ROW has a similar setup,
except that I largely abstract from the interactions between foreign oil producers and the
2Benkhodja (2014) compares welfare when the oil exporter either commits to strict consumer price
targeting or an exchange rate peg. However, the supply chain channel is completely abstracted from in that
study, as well as the characterization of Ramsey optimal policy.
3These sectors can also be labeled as traded and non-traded industries. However, I take a more agnostic
approach to the question of trade openness and calibrate both sectors’ trade shares to data.
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rest of the foreign economy. In doing so, I implicitly assume that oil producing countries
such as Saudi Arabia have a negligible impact on the world economy. Still, I treat the
international oil price as “semi-endogeneous” in the sense that it is determined by global
business cycles in addition to exogenous oil price shocks. Finally, this paper is concerned
with monetary policy implications of the supply chain, not with fiscal policy. To obtain
clear predictions and facilitate comparison with existing literature on monetary policy, I
assume that oil firms are owned by foreign agents. This allows me to abstract from issues
such as government spending of oil revenues. Below I describe the model block that
constitutes the SOE.
2.1 HOUSEHOLDS
First I describe the behavior by domestic household members. There is a measure one of
symmetric households. The representative household consists of a continuum of members
indexed by h ∈ (0, 1). Let subscript M refer to manufacturing sector variables, subscript
S refer to service sector variables, and subscript O refer to oil sector variables. Also, let
j ∈ {M,S} index the two non-oil sectors. A fraction µj of the household members work
in each non-oil sector j, while the fraction µO work in the oil sector. The measure of
workers in the SOE is µM + µS + µO = 1. Household member h working in sector j
maximizes expected lifetime utility given at time t by
Wj,t(h) = Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
log (Cs (h))− χN Lj,s (h)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
]
.
Et is the expectation operator conditional on the information set in period t. β ∈ (0, 1)
is a constant time discount factor. Cs(h) denotes period s consumption while Lj,s(h)
denotes hours worked. A worker employed in the oil sector has similar preferences, and
his hours is denoted by LO,s(h). Under the assumption of full consumption risk sharing
within the household, individual member h consumption is also aggregate consumption
(Ct(h) = Ct). I drop the h-subscript whenever possible from now on.
2.1.1 CONSUMPTION ALLOCATIONS AND BOND HOLDINGS
Aggregate consumption consists of the quantities CM and CS produced by manufacturing
and service firms, respectively.4 A fraction of consumption in each sector is imported. I
denote domestically produced sector j consumption by CHj , and imported consumption
by CFj . Both of these quantities consist of a continuum of products from each firm in the
domestic and foreign economy, respectively. All functional forms are assumed to exhibit
constant elasticity of substitution (CES). Cost minimizing demand for goods and service
consumption, and for domestic and imported consumption in sector j, are given in the
home economy by the following equations:5
CM,t
CS,t
=
ξ
1− ξ
(
PrM,t
PrS,t
)−ν
CHj,t
CFj,t
=
α¯j
1− α¯j
(
PrHj,t
PrFj,t
)−η
(1)
4Note that I abstract from the domestic consumption of oil goods.
5Unless stated explicitly, I deflate all nominal prices by the aggregate consumer price index Pt. Thus,
PrM,t ≡ PM,tPt refers to the real goods consumer price, PrS,t ≡
PS,t
Pt
refers to the real service consumer
price, and so on.
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Preferences for consumption goods from manufacturing (relative to services) in the total
consumption basket is determined by ξ, while the elasticity of substitution across sectors
is ν. The domestic weight in Cj is defined as α¯j = 1− (1− ς)(1− αj), where ς ∈ [0, 1]
represents the size of the SOE relative to the ROW. The degree of bias towards domes-
tic products in sector j is captured by αj ∈ [0, 1].6 Demand for firm specific consumer
products from each country’s sector j are given by CHj,t (f) =
(
PHj,t(f)
PHj,t
)− 1+p
p
CHj,t and
CFj,t (f) =
(
PFj,t(f)
PFj,t
)− 1+p
p
CFj,t, respectively. The foreign economy allocates consump-
tion expenditures according to similar first order conditions.
Besides these intratemporal decisions, households also choose how much to save in
domestic (risk free) bonds, and their supply of labor to domestic firms. Maximization
of lifetime utility with respect to aggregate consumption and bond holdings (subject to a
sequence of budget constraints) implies the following optimality conditions in period t:
Λt =
1
Ct
(2)
R−1t = βEt
(
Λt+1
Λt
Π−1t+1
)
(3)
Equation (2) states that maximization of lifetime utility implies equating the marginal
utility of consumption with Λt, the shadow value of the budget constraint. Equation (3),
the optimality condition for bond holdings, defines the optimal intertemporal consumption
path by equating the marginal utility loss from less consumption today with the marginal
utility gain from more consumption next period. The stochastic discount factor Zt,t+1 is
linked to the gross nominal interst rate by the identity Rt = 1Et(Zt,t+1) . By combining the
Euler equation in the world economy with equation (3), we get a standard risk-sharing
condition:
ΛtSt = ΛFt A0 (4)
St is the real exchange rate, i.e. the price of foreign consumption in terms of domestic
consumption. A0 = Λ0S0ΛF0 , which is determined by relative levels of initial wealth, is
normalized to it’s non-stochastic steady state value without loss of generality.7
2.1.2 LABOR MARKETS
Next I move to the labor market in sector j ∈ {G,S}, which is similar to that in Erceg,
Henderson, and Levin (2000). The labor market in each sector is populated by a compet-
itive labor bundler and the measure µj of workers. Workers cannot move between sectors
at within the business cycle. Still, I calibrate the model such that all workers earn identical
6The foreign counterpart is defined as α¯Fj = 1− ς
(
1− αFj
)
, where αFj is the sector specific home bias
in the ROW.
7The presence of home bias in consumption leads to asymmetric consumption gains of country specific
shocks. This asymmetry causes exchange rate movements even with perfect risk sharing. If the consumption
basket in the SOE has the same weights on domestic and foreign goods (i.e. if αM = αS = 0) as the ROW
basket, then we get perfect synchronization of consumption across countries and a constant real exchange
rate.
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wage and work the same number of hours in the non-stochastic steady state. The labor
bundler buys hours from all household members employed in the sector, combines these
hours into an aggregate labor service Nj,t, and sells it for a competitive wage to all firms
in the sector. The bundling technology is
Nj,t =
[(
1
µj
) w
1+w
∫ µj
0
Lj,t (h)
1
1+w dh
]1+w
.
Optimal demand for h-type labor is Lj,t (h) =
(
Ωj,t(h)
Ωj,t
)− 1+w
w
Ldj,t, where
Ldj,t =
Nj,t
µj
(5)
is defined as the average effective labor hours per worker in sector j. Ωj,t (h) and Ωj,t
are the individual and aggregate real wage, respectively. w governs the degree of market
power for workers.
The individual worker in sector j chooses a nominal wage rate to maximize lifetime
utility of his household, subject to the intertemporal budget constraint. The worker has
monopoly power, but sets wages subject to nominal wage stickiness a´ la Calvo (1983)
and Erceg et al. (2000). Each period, only a fraction 1 − θwj of the sector j workers
can re-optimize wages. The remaining fraction θwj supplies labor subject to their posted
wage in the previous period. Thus, when deciding the optimal wage, workers have to take
into account projections about future economic states. Let Ω¯j,t be the optimal wage in
period t. The relevant first order condition for Ω¯j,t equates the present value of current
and expected future labor income, Dj,t, with the present value of current and future labor
disutility Ej,t:
Dj,t = Ej,t. (6)
Dj,t and Ej,t account for the risk of being stuck with old wages, as can be seen from their
recursive representations:
Dj,t =
1
1 + w
Λt
(
Ω¯j,t
Ωj,t
)− 1
w
Ωj,tL
d
j,t + βθwjEt
[(
Ω¯j,t+1
Ω¯j,t
Πt+1
) 1
w
Dj,t+1
]
(7)
Ej,t = χN
(
Ω¯j,t
Ωj,t
)− 1+w
w
(1+ϕ)
Ldj,t
1+ϕ
+ βθwjEt
[(
Ω¯j,t+1
Ω¯j,t
Πt+1
) 1+w
w
(1+ϕ)
Ej,t+1,
]
(8)
Moreover, the sectoral real wage has the following law of motion:
Ω
− 1
w
j,t = (1− θwj) Ω¯
− 1
w
j,t + θwj
(
Ωj,t−1
Πt
)− 1
w
(9)
Equation (9) collapses to Ωj,t = Ω¯j,t in the limit as θwj → 0, and we get Ωj,t =
(1 + w)χN
Lj,t(h)
ϕ
Λt
from the system (6)-(8).8 Thus, the real wage is equated with the
markup times the marginal rate of substitution (between work and consumption) for all
household members in the special case with flexible sector j wages. This completes the
description of household behavior in the model.
8Note that limθwj→0 L
d
j,t = Lj,t(h) ∀ h.
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2.2 NON-OIL FIRMS
Next I describe firm behavior in domestic non-oil sectors. Firm f ∈ (0, 1) in non-oil
sector j ∈M,S maximizes an expected discounted dividend stream given by
Et
∞∑
s=t
Zt,sPsDj,s (f) ,
where Dj are the real dividends. Output in each period is given by
Yj,t (f) = Zj,tXj,t (f)
φj Nj,t (f)
1−φj − Φj,
where Xj,t (f) and Nj,t (f) are firm f ’s use of materials and labor respectively. Φj is
a fixed production cost that will be calibrated to ensure zero profit in the non-stochastic
steady state. Zj,t follows the law of motion
Zj,t = Z
1−ρZ
j Z
ρZ
j,t−1 exp (εj,t) , (10)
where εj,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2j
)
is refereed to as a sector specific total factor productivity (TFP)
shock.
2.2.1 FACTOR ALLOCATIONS
Aggregate intermediate input used by firm f in sector j is a function of manufacturing
and service inputs, denoted by XMj (f) and XSj (f) respectively. Each of these have
a domestic and imported component, XHlj (f) and XFlj (f) (j, l ∈ M,S), which again
consist of a continuum of material goods from every individual firm in both economies.
All functional forms are CES. Cost minimizing demand for materials from sector l, and
for relative demand for imported materials, follow below:
XMj,t (f)
XSj,t (f)
=
ζj
1− ζj
(
PrM,t
PrS,t
)−ν
XHlj,t (f)
XFlj,t (f)
=
α¯l
1− α¯l
(
PrHl,t
PrF l,t
)−η
(11)
The parameter ζj determines the steady state weight on manufactured materials in Xj .
Note that the import weight α¯j is the same in consumption. This implies that e.g. com-
puters have the same import weight in the SOE, regardless of whether they are used in
production or consumption. However, as computers may be used more or less intensively
in production, the import share in aggregate consumption and production will in general
be different. Demand for materials from each country’s sector j firm g ∈ (0, 1) is given by
XHlj,t (g, f) =
(
PHl,t(g)
PHl,t
)− 1+p
p
XHlj,t (f) and XFlj,t (g, f) =
(
PFl,t(g)
PFl,t
)− 1+p
p
MFlj,t (f),
respectively. Optimality conditions with respect to Xj,t (f) and Nj,t (f) can be summa-
rized by the equation
Xj,t (f)
Nj,t (f)
=
φj
1− φj
Ωj,t
P xrj,t
, (12)
where P xrj,t is the real price on Xj,t (f). It follows that real marginal costs RMCj,t are the
same for all firms, and expressed as
RMCj,t =
1
ZAj,t
(
P xrj,t
φj
)φj ( Ωj,t
1− φj
)1−φj
. (13)
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2.2.2 GOODS MARKETS
Price setting by domestic and foreign firms is subject to monopoly supply power and
sticky prices. Firms set nominal prices a´ la Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996), and price both
local goods and export goods in domestic currency. This is referred to in the literature
as producer currency pricing (PCP). Each period, only a fraction 1 − θpj of the firms in
sector j can change prices. The remaining fraction θpj of firms supply consumption and
material goods subject to their posted price in the previous period. Let P¯rj,t be the optimal
new price in period t in terms of consumption goods. It is pinned down by the identity
(1 + p)P
1+p
p
rHj,tGj,t = Hj,t, (14)
where Gj,t is the present discounted value of current and expected future marginal costs
(when P¯rj,t is in place), and Hj,t is the present value of current and future marginal rev-
enues. These can be represented recursively:
Gj,t = ΛtY
d
j,tRMCj,t + βθpjEt
(
Π
1+p
p
Hj,t+1Gj,t+1
)
(15)
Hj,t = ΛtY
d
j,tP¯rHj,tP
1+p
p
rHj,t + βθpjEt
(
P¯rHj,t
P¯rHj,t+1
Π
1
p
t+1Hj,t+1
)
(16)
Y dj,t is aggregate demand towards domestic sector j firms (see below). The law of motion
for new prices P¯rHj,t follows below:
P
− 1
p
rHj,t = (1− θpj) P¯
− 1
p
rHj,t + θpj
(
PrHj,t−1
Πt
)− 1
p
(17)
Equation (17) collapses to PrHj,t = P¯rHj,t in the limit as θpj → 0, and we get PrHj,t =
(1 + p)RMCj,t from the system (14)-(16). Thus, the real producer price is equated with
the markup times the marginal cost for all firms in the special case with flexible sector j
prices.
2.3 THE OIL SECTOR
Consider a representative oil firm in the SOE that takes the international oil price as given.
The oil firm maximizes profits given by
DO,t = StPrO,tYO,t −RqO,tQO,t − P xrO,tXO,t − ΩO,tNO,t,
where PrO,t is the international oil price (in ROW consumption units), YO,t is the oil
produced by the SOE, andRqO,tQO,t+P xrO,tXO,t+ΩO,tNO,t is the total cost of production.
QO,t represents all inputs used in the production of oil that do not come from the non-oil
SOE, including land and physical capital (e.g. drilling rigs and pipelines). XO,t is the
aggregate material input bought from non-oil firms in the SOE while NO,t is aggregate
labor services. Finally, the factor prices are denoted by RqO,t, P xO,t and ΩO,t respectively.
The key transmission channels between the oil sector and the rest of the economy are
fluctuations in P xrO,tXO,t and ΩO,tNO,t, as domestic non-oil firms and households are the
sole providers of materials and labor services to the oil sector.
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I let oil be produced by means of a simple Cobb-Douglas production technology:
YO,t = ZOQ
1−αo
O
(
XφoO,tN
1−φo
O,t
)αo
(18)
Note the assumption that QO is a constant, implying diminishing returns to scale in oil
production as long as αo < 1. I also abstract from oil specific technology shocks by
treating ZO as constant.9 The aggregate material input in the oil sector is a CES function
of inputs from domestic non-oil sectors.
Let ζO be the fraction of total oil materials that is produced by the goods sector. Profit
maximizing behavior then implies that the following set of conditions must hold in the oil
sector:
XMO,t
XSO,t
=
ζO
1− ζO
(
PrHM,t
PrHS,t
)−νo
(19)
XO,t = αoφoStPrO,t YO,t
P xrO,t
(20)
NO,t = αo (1− φo)StPrO,t YO,t
ΩO,t
(21)
The price on QO is pinned down by the equation RqO,t = (1− αo)StPrO,t YO,tQO . The
real wage ΩO,t is determined in the same way as wages in the non-oil sectors. Also,
XjO,t (f) =
(
PrHj,t(f)
PrHj,t
)− 1+p
p
XjO,t is the oil sector’s demand for materials from non-oil
firm f . For completeness, note that value added of oil production can be written as
GDPO,t = StPrO,tYO,t − P xrO,tXjO,t = (1− αoφo)StPrO,tYO,t. (22)
Thus, value added in the oil sector is high when i) the foreign currency is strong (since oil
is sold in foreign currency), ii) the world price of oil is high, and iii) when oil production
is high.
Market clearing in the international oil market dictates that world supply equals world
demand, or Y FO,t +
ς
1−ςYO,t = C
F
O,t. Taking the limit as ς goes to zero, we get
Y FO,t = ξoP
−ηo
rO,tC
F
t , (23)
where global demand for oil is assumed to be a downward sloping function of the real
oil price. The parameter ξo governs the steady state share of oil in aggregate world con-
sumption, while ηo is the price elasticity of oil demand. To keep the analysis as simple as
possible, I let Y FO,t ≡ ZPO,t follow the process
ZPO,t = Z
1−ρo
PO Z
ρo
PO,t−1 exp (εo,t) , (24)
where εo,t ∼ N (0, σ2o) is referred to as an international oil price shock. The implication
of this assumption is that PrO,t is driven by everything that affects world consumptionCFt ,
as well as the exogenous process for ZPO,t. At this level of abstraction, a rise in ZPO,t
is observationally equivalent with both a positive international oil supply a shock, and a
negative international oil demand shock. Therefore, I do not take a stand on the relative
importance of supply versus demand in oil markets. This completes the description of the
oil sector.
9In an earlier version I allowed for stochastic innovations in ZO, and interpreted these as domestic oil
supply shocks. However, the variance decomposition revealed that fluctuations in ZO only have a negligible
impact on macroeconomic fluctuations in the rest of the economy.
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2.4 MARKET CLEARING AND AGGREGATION
Next I report a set of aggregate equilibrium relationships in goods and labor markets in
the SOE. Aggregate hours in sector j is given by∫ µj
0
Lj,t (h) dh = L
d
j,tVwj,t. (25)
Vwj,t =
∫ µj
0
(
Ωj,t(h)
Ωj,t
)− 1+w
w
dh ≥ µj is a measure of cross-sectional wage dispersion. The
law of motion for wage dispersion is
Vwj,t = µj (1− θwj)
(
Ω¯j,t
Ωj,t
)− 1+w
w
+ θwjΠ
1+w
w
wj,t Vwj,t−1, (26)
where
Πwj,t =
Ωj,t
Ωj,t−1
Πt (27)
is the nominal wage inflation rate. Labor in the oil market is aggregated in the same way.
Total hours worked in the economy follows as LdM,tVwM,t + L
d
S,tVwS,t + L
d
O,tVwO,t.
Market clearing in factor markets implies that Nj,t =
∫ 1
0
Nj,t(f) df and Mj,t =∫ 1
0
Mj,t (f) df . Together with (12), these equations allow us to write aggregate gross
output in sector j as
∫ 1
0
Yj,t (f) df = Zj,tM
φj
j,tN
1−φj
j,t − Φj . Aggregate demand on the
other hand is
Y dj,t = Y
d
Hj,t + Y
dF
Hj,t +XjO,t, (28)
where Y dHj,t is total domestic demand (for sector j home goods) and Y
dF
Hj,t is total exports.
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Thus, market clearing in the goods market in sector j is given by
Zj,tX
φj
j,tN
1−φj
j,t − Φj = Y dj,tVpj,t. (29)
Cross-sectional price dispersion, Vpj,t =
∫ 1
0
(
PrHj,t(f)
PrHj,t
)− 1+p
p
df ≥ 1, is
Vpj,t = (1− θpj)
(
P¯rHj,t
PrHj,t
)− 1+p
p
+ θpjΠ
1+p
p
Hj,t Vpj,t−1, (30)
where
ΠHj,t =
PrHj,t
PrHj,t−1
Πt (31)
is defined as the nominal producer price inflation on domestically produced sector j
goods.
10Y dHj,t = CHj,t + XHjG,t + XHjS,t and Y
dF
Hj,t = C
F
Hj,t + X
F
HjG,t + X
F
HjS,t, respectively, where
j, l = [M,S].
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Regarding market clearing in goods markets, I restrict the analysis to the limiting case
where ς → 0, i.e. where trade between the ROW and the SOE becomes negligible from
the world economy’s point of view.11 Then, using the CES specifications, we can write
total absorption of domestically produced and imported sector j goods, respectively, as
follows:
Y dHj,t = αj
(
PrHj,t
Prj,t
)−η
(Cj,t +XjM,t +XjS,t) (32)
Y dFj,t = (1− αj)
(
PrFj,t
Prj,t
)−η
(Cj,t +XjG,t +XjS,t) , (33)
Finally, total foreign absorption of domestic exports is
Y d
F
Hj,t =
(
1− αFj
)(P FHj,t
P Fj,t
)−η (
CFj,t +X
F
jM,t +X
F
jS,t
)
. (34)
Nominal gross sales in sector j is PHj,tY dj,t. Real value added, which is the nominal
value added denominated by the CPI, is obtained by subtracting expenditures on interme-
diate inputs:
GDP j,t = PrHj,tY
d
j,t − P xrj,tXj,t
= Prj,t (Cj,t +XjM,t +XjS,t) + PrHj,tXjO,t + TBj,t − P xj,tXj,t (35)
The first line defines GDP in sector j according to the production approach, i.e. as the
value of gross output minus the value of intermediate inputs. The second line above is
GDP defined by the expenditure approach, and is obtained by combining PrHj,tY dj,t −
P xrj,tXj,t with equations (32)-(34). The trade balance in sector j is given by
TBj,t = PrHj,tY
dF
Hj,t − PrFj,tY dFj,t. (36)
For completeness, note that total value added in the SOE is V A = GDP t + GDPO,t,
where
GDPt = GDPM,t +GDP S,t
= Ct + TBt + αoφoStPrO,tYO,t (37)
is non-oil value added and TBt = TBM,t+TBS,t is the non-oil trade balance. The foreign
economy is characterized by a similar system of equations, except that trade constitutes a
negligible part of economic activity.
The model is completed with the determination of monetary and fiscal policy. I make
the conventional assumption that fiscal policy is passive (see Leeper (1991)). That is, fis-
cal authorities credibly commit to stabilization of public debt by means lump sum taxes.
However, I relax the popular assumption that fiscal tax systems are designed to neutralize
the steady state inefficiency due to monopoly power in labor and goods markets. Re-
garding the monetary policy regime, I describe interest rate determination in detail below.
This completes the description of the model.
11ς → 0 implies that imports and exports per capita in the ROW approaches zero.
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3 RAMSEY OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY
Next I set out to characterize optimal monetary policy. One popular approach to this end,
is to assume that fiscal authorities possess technologies (usually tax subsidies) that neu-
tralize steady state distortions from monopolistic competition. Under certain restrictions,
this assumption allows one to compute welfare by means of linear approximation meth-
ods. However, such technologies are clearly not widespread in data. Also, as emphasized
by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), they undermine the actual role of monetary author-
ities – to stabilize costly movements around potentially distorted trends. Thus, I do not
resort to subsidies of this sort. Rather, I solve for Ramsey optimal policy using a second
order approximation to policy functions. The Ramsey problem of the social planner in
the SOE is to maximize expected lifetime utility of households subject to i) the behavior
of private agents, ii) resource constraints in the SOE, and iii) the ROW counterparts of i)
and ii). Formally, the problem is
maxWt subject to EtF (Yt+1,Yt,Yt−1, et) = 0, (38)
where Y is the vector of all domestic and foreign endogenous variables and e is the vector
of exogenous shocks. The function F consists of all equilibrium conditions in the SOE
and the ROW, except for an equation describing the law of motion for R. The objective
function of the social planner is defined as the expected sum of all domestic households’
lifetime utility:
Wt ≡ Et
∫ 1
0
Wj,t(h) dh = Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
log (Cs)− χN
∑
{G,S,O} Lj,s
1+ϕVuj,s
1 + ϕ
]
(39)
The presence of wage stickiness introduces a cross-sectional wage dispersion term Vuj,t ≡∫ µj
0
(
Ωj,t(h)
Ωj,t
)− 1+w
w
(1+ϕ)
dh ≥ µj in the aggregate welfare function. It is similar to the
dispersion measure in (26), except for the presence of a curvature parameter ϕ. The law
of motion for Vuj,t is
Vuj,t = µj (1− θwj)
(
Ω¯j,t
Ωj,t
)− 1+w
w
(1+ϕ)
+ θwjΠwj,t
1+w
w
(1+ϕ)Vuj,t−1.
I use perturbation methods to obtain a second order approximation of the first order condi-
tions for the problem in (38). The approximation is taken around a non-stochastic steady
state described in the appendix. The model solution is derived from the resulting system,
see e.g. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004) for details.
3.1 CALIBRATION
The non-stochastic steady state is one in which all relative prices (including the real ex-
change rate), as well as consumption in both economies, are normalized to unity. Hours
is normalized to 1
3
. Given these values, I solve recursively for all the remaining endoge-
nous variables including sector specific productivity. The steady state is described in the
appendix. Calibration choices are summarized in Table 1. β = 0.99 implies an annual
steady state real interest rate of about 4%. Is set ϕ consistent with a Frisch elasticty of
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Table 1: Benchmark calibration
Parameter Description Value
β Time discount factor 0.99
ϕ Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply 2
χN Set to fit steady state hours equal to 1/3 23.9
p Steady state mark-up, individual goods 20%
w Steady state mark-up, labor types 20%
η Elasticity of substitution, countries 0.9
ν Elasticity of substitution, sectors 0.9
Non-oil industries (1) (2)
θwj Calvo probability of no wage change 0.75 0.75
θpj Calvo probability of no price change 0.25 0.75
αj , αFj Steady state import/export share of GDP 0.60 0.15
ξ Steady state share of sector consumption 0.35 0.65
φj Steady state materials share in gross output 0.6 0.4
ζj Steady state manufacturing share in materials 0.7 0.3
Oil sector and oil markets
ξo Steady state world oil share in GDP 0.02
ηo Price elasticity of oil demand 0.35
νo Elasticity of substitution, oil material input 0.9
αo Steady state labor and material share in oil production 0.2
φo Steady state material share in variable oil input 0.7
ζo Steady state manufacturing share in oil materials 0.4
Shocks
σεj Standard deviation, TFP 0.018 0.006
ρA Persistence, TFP 0.7
σεo Standard deviation, oil price shock 0.06
ρO Persistence, oil price shock 0.95
Note: This table presents calibrated values in the benchmark model. The non-oil industries are (1)
manufacturing and (2) services.
0.5, in the mid range of micro and macro estimates. I follow the estimates by Molnarova
and Reiter (2014) and set the elasticity of substitution across sectors (for consumption
and materials) to 0.9. It is in the upper range of estimates by Atalay (2013), but below the
conventional value of unity (Cobb-Douglas) used in much previous literature. I choose
the same value for η, based on estimates by e.g. Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008) and
Bergholt (2014).
Turning to sector parameters, I calibrate θpj to match an average price duration in man-
ufacturing and services equal to 4
3
and 4 quarters, respectively. This is broadly consistent
with various estimates of price stickiness at the sector level (Nakamura and Steinsson,
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Table 2: Benchmark steady state ratios
Description Value
µM Share of labor force in manufacturing 0.33
µS Share of labor force in services 0.65
µO Share of labor force in oil sector 0.02
YM/(YM + YS) Manufacturing share in gross non-oil output 0.43
YS/(YM + YS) Service share in gross non-oil output 0.57
GDPM/GDP Manufacturing share in non-oil GDP 0.33
GDPS/GDP Service sector share in non-oil GDP 0.67
GDPO/V A Oil sector share in aggregate GDP 0.20
(XFM +XFS)/GDP Import (and export) share in non-oil GDP 0.30
(CFM + CFS)/C Import (and export) share in consumption 0.15
Note: This table presents ratios in the non-stochastic steady state as implied by the calibration
in Table 1.
2008; Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia, 2009). Wages in all sectors are assumed to ad-
just on average once every year. Regarding trade openness, I let most exports and imports
take place in the manufacturing sector. I assume that the non-oil trade balances are zero in
each sector, and set the export/import share of GDP to 0.6 and 0.15, respectively. These
numbers are similar to the trade shares in Norway the last 30 years. Moreover, consistent
with Norwegian data I let most consumption goods be produced by the service sector.
Parameters related to oil markets are calibrated as follows: The oil share in world
consumption is set to 2%, while the elasticity of substitution between oil and non-oil
consumption is set to 0.35. The former number is consistent with IEA data, the latter
with estimates in the oil literature (Hamilton, 2009; Bodenstein and Guerrieri, 2012). I
calibrate the share of oil GDP in total GDP in the SOE to be broadly consistent with
Norwegian data (20%). The calibration choices for αo and φo imply that about 14%
of total production expenditures in the oil sector is on mainland inputs. Out of those
expenditures, 40% is on input from the manufacturing sector. Finally, implied wage costs
in the oil sector amounts to about 6% of total production costs. These shares are similar
to those reported in the OECD-STAN dataset for the Norwegian SIC industries 10-14.
The dynamics in the model are driven by 5 shocks – 2 sector specific TFP shocks in
each economy and 1 oil market shock. The TFP shocks are calibrated to match a quar-
terly standard deviation of GDP of about 2.75%, given that monetary authorities follow
a modified Taylor rule (see below). Motivated by previous literature (Bouakez et al.,
2009; Bergholt, 2014), I let TFP be three times more volatile in the manufacturing sector
compared to the service sector. Finally, the oil price shock is set to match the standard
deviation in real oil prices of about 55%, and a first order autocorrelation of about 0.95.
Regarding the calibration of structural parameters belonging to the ROW, I assume they
take the same values as in the SOE. Thus, in the absence of oil, and with balanced trade,
all steady state variables take the same values in both economies (in terms of per capita
units).
Table 2 reports implied steady state ratios in the model. A few remarks are in place:
First, the large majority of the work force is employed in non-oil industries, even though
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oil represents a significant fraction of total GDP. This reflects the view that oil production
requires little labor. Second, manufacturing represents a larger fraction of gross output
than of value added in the economy. The main reason is that intermediate inputs are more
important in manufacturing production in the data. Third, the import share in consumption
is substantially lower than the import share in GDP. This is because the service sector,
which has a low import share, accounts for most of the consumption output.
3.2 A BENCHMARK EVALUATION OF RAMSEY OPTIMAL POLICY
What are the implications of Ramsey optimal monetary policy in the model? To answer
this question, I compare the economy under Ramsey policy with the economy when the
interest rate is set according to a Taylor-type rule. The latter is often used as an approxi-
mation to interest rate policy in estimated New Keynesian models. The interest rate rule
takes the form
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρr[(Πt
Π
)ρpi( GDP t
GDP t−1
)ρy]1−ρr
,
where the implicit assumption is that monetary authorities only respond to non-oil GDP.
Response coefficients are set as follows: ρr = 0.75, ρpi = 2, and ρy = 0.05. These
numbers are similar to those estimated by Bergholt (2014) for Canada and the US in a
medium scale DSGE model. The open economy dimension of the model complicates
the task of comparing policies because one has to consider how foreign interest rates are
determined. In the main analysis, I suppose that monetary policy in the ROW follows a
Taylor rule symmetric to the one described above. As pointed out by De Paoli (2009),
policy choices in the ROW influence how (ROW) shocks affect foreign variables, but they
do not modify the way in which foreign variables affect the SOE.
3.2.1 IMPULSE RESPONSES TO OIL SHOCKS
To understand the implications of Ramsey optimal policy, I compare impulse responses of
domestic variables to shocks under the two policy regimes. I use the pruned state-space
solution to avoid explosive paths, following Kim, Kim, Schaumburg, and Sims (2008).
Impulse responses are plotted in Figure 1-Figure 3, where the plots are sample averages
of 200 simulations.
First I discuss impulse responses to an international oil price shock. They are plotted
in Figure 1. The shock leads to higher domestic (non-oil) GDP, hours and wages, both
under Ramsey optimal policy (blue lines) and under the Taylor rule (red lines). Moreover,
the real exchange rate appreciates and terms of trade improve in both sectors. To gain
some intuition, let us for the moment restrict attention to responses under the Taylor rule:
Higher oil prices create a boom in the oil sector, causing more demand for labor and
materials in that sector. This maps into the non-oil economy as a demand shock, both
in labor and goods markets. Non-oil firms, which are linked to the oil sector via supply
chains, respond to the higher demand by increasing their prices. Consumption demand on
the other hand falls because of higher real interest rates. The latter observation explains
why we get a real exchange rate appreciation.12 In fact, the appreciation is so strong
12Risk sharing in international asset markets implies perfect correlation between the real exchange rate
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to oil shocks
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Note: Impulse responses to an innovation in εo (one standard deviation). Measured in percentage
deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. The trade balance is measured in absolute deviations and
as a fraction of GDP.
that the CPI falls the first period after shock. Domestic producer price inflation and the
exchange rate appreciation both cause a rise in the relative price on domestically produced
goods, i.e. a terms of trade improvement. Non-oil firms also require more production
inputs, so demand for labor increases in all sectors. The rise in hours worked takes the
marginal rate of substitution, χN
Lϕj,t
Λt
, above its preferred value 1
1+w
Ωj,t. Households then
respond by raising nominal wages in order to align real wages with the marginal rate of
and the relative consumption level in the SOE (see equation (4)). Thus, the model’s ability to explain cur-
rency appreciation comes at the cost of counter-intuitive movements in consumption. This can in principle
be overturned by assuming that households’ utility is non-separable in consumption and hours worked.
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substitution.13 This is how the oil price shock generates wage inflation in the non-oil
economy. The drop in net exports is partly explained by non-oil firms’ higher demand
for intermediate inputs (which have an imported component), and partly explained by
expenditure switching – both among households and firms, towards relatively cheaper
foreign consumption and materials.
It is important to understand the inefficiencies associated with macroeconomic dy-
namics under the Taylor rule. Have in mind that high oil price makes it efficient to
reallocate productive resources from non-oil use towards the oil sector. If wages and
prices were perfectly flexible, this reallocation would have been implemented by a pro-
longed period with high real interest rates and appreciated domestic currency. However,
wage and price stickiness prevent sufficient general equilibrium substitution, while at the
same time causing i) cross-sectional wage dispersion across otherwise identical workers,
and ii) cross-sectional price dispersion across otherwise identical firms. Cross-sectional
dispersion arises because each worker and firm has a different history of Calvo draws.
Moreover, dispersion is costly because workers and firms with same ex ante productivity
level end up operating at different margins.
How are these inefficiencies dealt with by the Ramsey planner? The impulse responses
allow us to draw some inference. Compared to a Taylor rule, the Ramsey optimal response
is an aggressive increase of the nominal interest rate, as seen in Figure 1. This exaggerates
the rise in real interest rates, implying further contraction of consumption and apprecia-
tion of the exchange rate. The gains are two-fold: First, less non-oil demand and stronger
domestic currency helps to bring down the marginal costs of non-oil firms. In fact, un-
der optimal policy real marginal costs RMCj,t drop below the preferred level 11+pPrHj,t,
resulting in producer price deflation instead of inflation. Thus, more resources can be
reallocated to oil via domestic supply chains, allowing oil firms to explore more of the
rents associated with high oil prices. Second, optimal policy effectively neutralizes much
of the incentive for households to increase nominal wages. To see this, note that both
producer price deflation and exchange rate appreciation map into lower consumer prices,
and consequently into higher real wages. At the same time, less non-oil demand limits
the expansionary effects on hours worked and non-oil GDP. Now, because the marginal
rate of substitution is increasing in both hours and consumption, and because real wages
are stimulated by low consumer prices, the two move much more in line under Ramsey
optimal policy. One should note that the exchange rate is a key ingredient in the trans-
mission mechanism under optimal policy. This observation is an early warning against
policies aimed at stabilizing the exchange rate. Finally, the welfare costs associated with
declining producer prices are limited by the fact that producer price deflation converges
back to the steady state after a few periods.
One important remark is in place at this point. The supply chain linking non-oil firms
to the oil sector is crucial for the transmission of oil shocks to the non-oil economy. If one
abstracts from this link by setting φo = 0, almost all the spillover disappears. Aggregate
wages and hours worked in the economy are still (mildly) affected because of workers
in the oil sector, but all the remaining non-oil variables become nearly orthogonal to the
13This insight comes from a first order approximation of the wage inflation equation, i.e. the New Key-
nesian wage Phillips curve. For given expectations of future inflation, this equation predicts a negative
relationship between wage inflation on the one hand, and the spread between real wages and the marginal
rate of substitution on the other.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to non-oil shocks 1
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Note: Impulse responses to innovations in εj and εFj (one standard deviation). See Figure 1.
oil price shock. Obviously, if also αo = 0, then even the transmission to sectoral labor
markets is gone. In total we get a boom in the non-oil economy that, without resorting to
spillover via e.g. government spending policies, would not take place in the absence of
the supply chain linkages. We also get movements in terms of trade and the real exchange
rate that at least qualitatively resemble estimates in the VAR literature.
3.2.2 IMPULSE RESPONSES TO NON-OIL SHOCKS
Next I first consider responses to domestic and foreign TFP shocks. Higher productivity
causes a boom in the SOE under both policies. That is, GDP and consumption rise for a
prolonged number of periods, although the responses under optimal policy are stronger.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to non-oil shocks 2
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Note: Impulse responses to innovations in εj and εFj (one standard deviation). See Figure 1.
This is true for productivity shocks in both sectors in both countries. Under the Taylor
rule, both CPI and PPI inflation go down due to the drop in domestic marginal costs. As
the Taylor rule assigns a high weight to CPI stability, this implies a drop in the interest
rate as well. Responses of the CPI and PPI under Ramsey policy are similar, except
for an initial jump in the CPI following a domestic service sector shock. This jump
comes about from the large initial exchange rate depreciation associated with the Ramsey
policy. The impulse responses to foreign productivity shocks are qualitatively similar
to domestic shocks, except that we get a real appreciation and a negative trade balance.
The real exchange rate appreciates because foreigners enjoy a relatively larger increase
in consumption when foreign firms become more productive. The trade balance declines
because of substitution away from domestically produced goods. However, as shown
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by Bergholt and Sveen (2014), we still get a boom in the SOE. This has to do with the
sectoral input-output linkages within and across economies, which allow cheap import of
materials to domestic firms.
The most substantial difference between the Taylor rule and Ramsey optimal policy is
found in labor markets. Consider first the responses of hours to productivity shocks under
the Taylor rule. Hours decline – a standard feature of most New Keynesian models. The
intuition is simple: Price stickiness creates too little deflation compared to real business
cycle economies, thus, too little increase in aggregate demand and output. Firms (in par-
ticular those that cannot reduce their prices) then respond to the markup over preferred
prices by reducing their demand for inputs. However, in a model with intermediate trade,
another force drives down hours even further: The decline in prices makes materials rel-
atively cheaper than labor, so there is substitution away from labor along the intensive
margin of inputs. The large drop in hours takes the marginal rate of substitution below
the real wage, leading to nominal wage deflation.
Notably, most of the drop in hours under the Taylor rule is removed by the Ramsey
policy – hours even rise slightly after foreign TFP shocks. More importantly, we get a
small nominal wage increase instead of deflation. The intuition follows along the lines
of Ramsey optimal response to oil price shocks: Nominal interest rates decline more,
implying lower real interest rates. This stimulates consumption demand via the Euler
equation, causing higher aggregate demand than with the Taylor policy. High demand
prevents the large decline in hours worked. Finally, the combination of high demand and
limited movements in hours removes most of the wedge between the marginal rate of
substitution and the real wage.
3.2.3 BUSINESS CYCLE MOMENTS
Table 3 reports simulated moments and variance decompositions. Consistent with the im-
pulse response analysis, we get more volatile GDP, consumption and real exchange rate
under Ramsey optimal policy. Wage inflation and hours on the other hand are less volatile.
The small differences in PPI inflation volatility under the two policies are consistent with
the view that wage inflation stability is most important in the model. Aggregate consump-
tion, hours and real wages are pro-cyclical under both policies, while nominal CPI and
PPI inflation, as well as the interest rate, are counter-cyclical. Counter-cyclicality of infla-
tion rates is a result of the predominance of TFP shocks in the model. The non-oil trade
balance is countercyclical – as in the data. Note that the ability of Ramsey optimal policy
to insulate wage inflation from TFP shocks turns it from counter-cyclical to pro-cyclical.
The variance decomposition shows that the oil price shock is an important source of
business cycle fluctuations in the model. It explains about 36% the fluctuations in non-oil
GDP under the Taylor rule, comparable to the 31-36% found by Bjørnland and Thorsrud
(2013) for Norway.14 The same study estimates that 16-24% of wage fluctuations are
caused by oil shocks. The contribution of oil price shocks to trade balance fluctuations in
the model is about 40%, while more than half of the fluctuations in hours worked stems
from oil prices when the Taylor rule is in place.
14The authors separate between oil price shocks and oil activity shocks. The numbers are the sum of
these two. Also, they report variance decompositions 4 and 8 horizons ahead, while I report stationary
variance decompositions.
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Table 3: Business cycle statistics – Taylor rule versus Ramsey optimal policy
Moments Variance decomposition
σx ρx,y εm εs ε
F
m ε
F
s εo
Panel A – Taylor rule
GDP 2.76 1.00 46.38 5.73 11.31 0.12 36.45
Consumption 2.14 0.52 62.03 7.10 16.64 0.38 13.86
Hours 2.34 0.10 28.36 12.84 5.56 0.13 53.10
Trade balance 0.42 -0.20 21.39 5.74 25.08 6.18 41.61
Interest rate 0.64 -0.73 69.04 4.12 25.59 0.53 0.72
CPI Inflation 0.88 -0.57 66.21 1.46 31.70 0.43 0.20
PPI inflation 1.02 -0.52 95.11 1.81 2.96 0.04 0.09
Wage inflation 0.18 -0.29 61.76 6.58 12.88 0.37 18.40
Real wages 1.76 0.81 58.50 3.71 18.71 0.41 18.66
Real exchange rate 2.65 0.11 40.76 4.66 40.75 4.71 9.11
Oil price inflation 18.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 7.04 0.26 92.70
Panel B – Ramsey optimal policy
GDP 3.46 1.00 59.79 16.16 10.30 0.16 13.60
Consumption 3.25 0.73 59.26 16.05 10.85 0.29 13.55
Hours 1.29 0.22 3.40 0.22 0.38 0.02 95.98
Trade balance 0.41 -0.04 18.76 3.84 28.96 6.95 41.50
Interest rate 0.90 -0.83 64.40 28.77 4.35 0.21 2.28
CPI Inflation 0.76 -0.44 56.23 3.79 37.09 0.39 2.50
PPI inflation 0.96 -0.48 96.53 0.90 2.39 0.02 0.16
Wage inflation 0.04 0.42 6.10 15.27 2.03 0.15 76.44
Real wages 1.64 0.86 54.21 3.70 18.41 0.38 23.30
Real exchange rate 3.45 0.46 52.75 14.29 18.87 2.02 12.06
Oil price inflation 18.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 7.04 0.26 92.70
Note: σx is the standard deviation of variable x (in %), ρx,y is the correlation with GDP. The remaining
columns report the variance decomposition of each variable (in %). Business cycle statistics at the
sector level are provided in Table B.1 in the appendix.
Ramsey optimal policy shifts the importance of oil shocks from GDP to domestic
labor markets. In fact, almost all the variation in hours is explained by these shocks under
optimal policy. This is also apparent from the impulse response functions. The oil price
shock not only creates a substantial jump in hours on impact, it also passes on the high
persistence. The main contribution to aggregate hours comes from labor in the oil sector,
which inherits much of the volatility in oil prices. Also wage inflation is substantially
affected by the oil price under optimal policy. This raises the question of whether the
central bank should be particularly concerned with the wage and price impulses coming
from the oil sector. That question is analyzed in detail in the next section.
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4 WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES
Having described transmission mechanisms under optimal monetary policy, I next set
out to analyze the welfare implications of alternative policy rules. To this end I follow
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), and rank different policy regimes based on their con-
sumption equivalent losses relative to the Ramsey policy. LetW it be the expected lifetime
utility associated with some policy i. Moreover, let λi be the increase in period consump-
tion that the representative household would require in order to be indifferent between
Ramsey equilibrium and equilibrium under policy i. Expected lifetime utility under Ram-
sey optimal monetary policyR can then be written as
WRt = Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
log
(
Cis
(
1 + λi
))− χN∑{M,S,O} Lij,s1+ϕV iuj,s
1 + ϕ
]
,
where
{
Cis, L
i
M,s, L
i
S,s, L
i
O,s
}∞
s=t
are the paths for consumption and labor under policy i.
Given the assumed functional form for period utility, we can solve for λi to get
λi = exp
[
(1− β) (WRt −W it)]− 1,
where W it ≡ Et
∑∞
s=t β
s−t
[
log (Cis)− χN
∑
{M,S,O} L
i
j,s
1+ϕ
V iuj,s
1+ϕ
]
. It is clear from the ex-
pression for λ that λi > 0 if and only ifWRt >W it .
The analysis of alternative targeting rules is done in three steps. First I study a set
of strict targeting rules, where the interest rate is set to neutralize all movements in some
target variable. This allows us to identify variables in the model that are promising can-
didates for more operative policy rules. Second I study a set of simple Taylor type rules,
where the interest rate responds linearly to some target variable. I compare different de-
grees of responsiveness, with strict targeting as the limiting case. I also compare different
sizes of the oil sector’s supply chain in order to shed light on the role of oil exports for
optimal policy. Third, I search for response coefficients that maximize welfare within a
large set of Taylor rules. A set of six variables is analyzed. These are (quarter-to-quarter)
CPI inflation Πc,t, PPI inflation Πp,t, wage inflation Πw,t, nominal exchange rate depreci-
ation ∆Et, nominal non-oil GDP growth ∆GDPn,t, and the cost deflator for the oil supply
chain, ΠdefO,t .
4.1 STRICT TARGETING RULES
To shed light on the partial effects of stabilizing specific economic variables, I first con-
sider a set of strict targeting rules. Suppose the central bank sets the nominal interest rate
in order to prevent any movement in some variable Zt. A policy dedicated to hit the target
σ2Z = 0 is referred to as a strict targeting rule.
Table 4 reports the results for different strict targeting rules in the oil exporting SOE.
Panel A presents the results when the oil supply chain is in place, panel B shows the
results when αo = 0. Consider first the top rows in the panels. An interesting starting
point is the natural equilibrium, defined as the equilibrium associated with full wage and
price flexibility (θpj = θwj = θwo = 0). Monopoly power is still in place in the natural
equilibrium, as I do not resort to subsidies aimed at shifting the steady state to the first
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Table 4: Welfare under strict targeting rules
Z WL (%) λ (%) W σx
GDP C N Πc Πw
Panel A – Benchmark: Oil supply chain
Nat. eq. 0.20 -0.06 -30.27 3.46 3.33 1.10 1.27 0.91
Ramsey 0.00 0.00 -30.34 3.46 3.25 1.29 0.76 0.04
Πc -1.78 0.55 -30.89 7.57 7.31 4.77 0.00 0.23
Πp -18.65 7.20 -37.29 20.94 20.99 18.23 3.38 0.62
Πw -0.04 0.01 -30.35 2.99 2.94 1.27 0.83 0.00
∆E -1.01 0.31 -30.65 3.12 2.37 2.95 0.92 0.23
∆GDPn -0.26 0.08 -30.42 2.03 2.22 2.15 1.01 0.05
ΠdefO -18.34 7.05 -37.15 17.76 18.42 15.16 2.94 0.78
Panel B – Counterfactural: No oil supply chain
Nat. eq. 0.35 -0.10 -28.00 3.14 3.23 0.39 1.29 0.78
Ramsey 0.00 0.00 -28.10 3.19 3.11 0.29 0.74 0.02
Πc -1.86 0.53 -28.63 7.32 7.41 4.23 0.00 0.22
Πp -20.17 7.36 -35.20 21.04 21.41 18.05 3.37 0.61
Πw -0.02 0.01 -28.11 2.78 2.69 0.72 0.80 0.00
∆E -0.93 0.27 -28.36 2.29 2.30 2.14 0.92 0.20
∆GDPn -0.24 0.07 -28.17 1.74 1.71 1.97 0.98 0.05
ΠdefO -19.46 7.03 -34.89 18.47 18.78 15.70 2.96 0.76
Note: The first column reports the relative difference in welfare between policy i and the Ramsey
policy, i.e. WL = 100
( Wit
WRt − 1
)
, given that policy stabilizes the target Z. The second col-
umn shows the loss in consumption units. The third column reports the expected welfare level.
The remaining columns report the standard deviation of non-oil GDP, consumption, hours, CPI
inflation, and wage inflation.
best. The welfare level in natural equilibrium is about 0.2% higher than the optimal policy
when the supply chain is present. This corresponds to a consumption gain of less than
0.1%. Thus, Ramsey optimal policy is able to approximate the natural equilibrium welfare
fairly well in this case. However, the volatility of wages and prices are very different.
Wage and price inflation volatility is low in the Ramsey equilibrium because i) wages and
prices are sticky, and ii) because optimal policy stabilizes wages and prices. Apparently,
natural equilibrium and the Ramsey equilibrium display similar welfare differences when
I shut down the supply chain. This demonstrates that the ability of the Ramsey planner
to approximate welfare in absence of wage and price stickiness, does not hinge on the oil
sector. However, one should note that the welfare relevant benchmark in open economies
in general differs from the natural equilibrium. The reason is that monetary authorities can
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affect expected real exchange rates via their influence on the exchange rate volatility. This
leads to a terms of trade externality with implications for welfare, see De Paoli (2009) for
a detailed analysis. Thus, welfare under Ramsey optimal policy serves as a benchmark
reference point when I evaluate alternative policy rules.
One important result emerges when we compare the remaining rows in the two panels:
The oil supply chain has very limited effects of welfare. That is, the welfare ranking of
different strict targets is not altered by the presence of the supply chain. Moreover, the
absolute welfare level for a given target is not much affected either. This is true for
all targets under consideration. However, there are potentially large welfare differences
across different targets. Strict wage inflation targeting is ranked on top, followed by
nominal GDP targeting. The performance of strict wage targeting is not surprising given
the low wage inflation volatility in Ramsey equilibrium. Stabilization of nominal GDP
implies very low wage inflation volatility as well. Thus, the results in Table 4 provides
further evidence of the gains related to wage stability. The worst targets are the PPI and
the supply chain deflator. Strictly stabilizing any of these variables is disastrous from a
welfare perspective. About 18% of welfare is lost, implying that households would need a
7% increase in consumption to be as well off as under the Ramsey policy. These policies
also lead to enormous movements in most macroeconomic variables, e.g. GDP 6 times
as volatile as in the Ramsey case. This comes about from the movements in nominal
interest rates needed to stabilize the two targets. Excessive macroeconomic volatility can
be problematic for agents in the economy for reasons that are not captured in the current
framework. In any case, the results suggest that one should accommodate rather than
trying to fight the price impulses from oil to non-oil variables.
Oil exports aside, the results presented here contrast those in Galı´ and Monacelli
(2005), where strict producer price targeting is optimal. Several arguments work against
PPI stability in the current model: First, sector specific shocks and rigidities create trade-
offs between disaggregate prices, as in Aoki (2001). Second, wage stickiness creates a
trade-off between wage and price stability, as in Campolmi (2014). Third, the ability of
policy makers to influence average terms of trade takes optimal policy away from the
natural equilibrium, as shown by De Paoli (2009). Finally, trade in intermediate goods
changes the dynamics of labor market variables in a way that, coupled with wage sticki-
ness, amplifies the importance of wage stability.
4.2 FLEXIBLE SIMPLE TAYLOR RULES
Implementing strict targeting rules requires knowledge about the true feedback system
(the policy rules of private agents) that determines macroeconomic dynamics. It also
requires that the central bank can infer the true state of the economy, including unobserved
shadow prices as well as all the exogenous shocks. These considerations make strict
targeting rules difficult to implement in practice. A common response to this concern
in the literature is to analyze simple rules, typically some types of Taylor rules. Next I
analyze a policy rule given by
Rt
R
=
(
Zt
Z
)ρz
,
where Z is the targeting variable. This rule is simple in the sense that policy actions only
requires knowledge about Z.
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Figure 4: Simple Taylor rules and the role of oil supply chains 1
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Note: Welfare losses in a) the (αo, ρpic)-space, b) the
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)
-space, and c) the (αo, ρpiw)-space.
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Figure 5: Simple Taylor rules and the role of oil supply chains 2
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Two observations are important: First, for all the target variables under consideration,
determinacy requires that ρz > 1. Second, for all the variables under consideration, this
rule converges to strict targeting in the limit as ρz goes to infinity. Thus, the simple Taylor
rule allows us to shed light on how the degree of responsiveness to specific macroeco-
nomic fluctuations affect welfare. To provide insights regarding the importance of oil for
policy, I set up a grid of size 20×20 in the (αo, ρz)-space, and simulate the model for each
point on the grid. The bounds on the parameters are αo = [0.01, 0.2] and ρz = [1.01, 5],
respectively.
Figure 4-Figure 5 plot the resulting welfare losses (in %) relative to Ramsey optimal
policy, against pairs of (αo, ρz). Consider first the top panel in Figure 4, which shows
results when the Taylor rule includes CPI inflation. Welfare losses are smallest when ρpic
either takes a relatively low value, or when the policy response implies something close
to full CPI stability (see Table 4). However, differences in welfare between the “best” and
“worst” choice of ρpic are rather small – about 1-2%. Importantly, this conclusion seems
fairly robust to the size of the supply chain. Next, consider a simple Taylor rule with
producer price inflation only. The optimal response coefficient is about 1.4, regardless of
spillover from the oil sector. For higher values of ρpip welfare decreases monotonically
towards the level associated with a strict target. The optimal response coefficient with
αo = 0.2 leads to a welfare loss close to 1.4%. Thus, the large welfare loss associated
with strict PPI targeting does not carry over in general. Turning to wage inflation, I
find that the relationship between welfare and ρpiw is strictly positive. Moreover, the
figure suggests that one can approximate Ramsey optimal policy reasonably well with a
reasonable wage inflation response, because the marginal gain of a more aggressive wage
inflation response quickly diminishes as ρpiw increases. The role of αo is also fairly small
for ρpiw > 2. The story is similar for the last three targets. Stronger responses are better
across most of the parameter space, and the role of αo is usually minor except in regions
close to indeterminacy.15 These results add to the idea that optimal policy is not affected
in any fundamental sense by the presence of an oil exporting sector.
4.3 OPTIMIZED TARGETING RULES
Finally I analyze a large set of modified Taylor rules of the form
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρr[(Z1,t
Z1
)ρz1(Z2,t
Z2
)ρz2]1−ρr
.
For each pair of flexible targets (Z1, Z2), I search for the coefficients (ρr, ρz1 , ρz2) that
minimize the welfare loss relative to Ramsey optimal policy. The resulting interest rate
equation is referred to as an optimized Taylor rule. In general this rule covers as special
cases both the simple Taylor rules in subsection 4.2 (ρr = ρz2 = 0) and the strict targeting
rules in subsection 4.1 (ρr = ρz2 = 0, ρz1 = ∞). The search grid is an array of size
10 × 11 × 11 with equally spaced nodes. The bounds are ρr = [0, 0.9], ρz1 = [0, 3], and
ρz2 = [0, 3]. Parameter combinations implying indeterminacy are disregarded. The aim
here is not to identify a “best rule” (model uncertainty aside, that would require a much
finer grid and wider bounds). Instead, I attempt to shed some light on a set of simple,
operational rules that can approximate optimal policy reasonably well.
15The results become prone to numerical approximation errors when ρz → 1.
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Table 5: Optimized Taylor rules
Z1 \Z2 Πc Πp Πw ∆E ∆GDPn ΠdefO
Πc –
ρr = 0.9 ρr = 0.9 ρr = 0.9 ρr = 0.8 ρr = 0.9
ρpic = 3 ρpic = 3 ρpic = 3 ρpic = 3 ρpic = 3
ρpip = 2.7 ρpiw = 3 ρ∆e = 0 ρ∆gdp = 2.7 ρpidefo = 0.3
Πp −0.17 –
ρr = 0.9 ρr = 0.9 ρr = 0.8 ρr = 0.9
ρpip = 3 ρpip = 3 ρpip = 3 ρpip = 3
ρpiw = 3 ρ∆e = 0.3 ρ∆gdp = 2.7 ρpidefo = 0.3
Πw −0.10 −0.09 –
ρr = 0.8 ρr = 0 ρr = 0.8
ρpiw = 3 ρpiw = 3 ρpiw = 3
ρ∆e = 0 ρ∆gdp = 0.6 ρpidefo = 0
∆E −0.24 −0.25 −0.17 –
ρr = 0.9 ρr = 0.9
ρ∆e = 0 ρ∆e = 1.2
ρ∆gdp = 3 ρpidefo = 0.6
∆GDPn −0.10 −0.09 −0.16 −0.21 –
ρr = 0.9
ρ∆gdp = 3
ρpidefo = 0
ΠdefO −0.18 −0.21 −0.17 −0.74 −0.21 –
Note: The upper triangle of the table shows the optimized combination of policy coefficients for a
given pair (Z1, Z2). The lower triangle reports welfare losses (in %) relative to Ramsey optimal
policy.
Results are provided in Table 5. In all cases the optimum is identified in the upper
bound of at least one dimension of the grid. Moreover, the upper bounds are always
optimal for the coefficients ρpic and ρpiw , while ρpidefo and ρpi∆e usually are close to the
lower bound. The optimal rule implies high interest rate persistence for or all response
combinations except the one involving wages and nominal GDP growth. For all rules,
we see that one is able to do reasonably well compared to the more extreme scenarios
analyzed in subsection 4.1 and subsection 4.2. In particular, with high interest rate inertia
and a large weight on either wage or CPI inflation, even a rule involving ΠdefO can lead to
welfare losses around 0.2% compared to the Ramsey optimal policy. The smallest welfare
losses in Table 5 are associated with rules involving either CPI or PPI inflation on the one
side, and either wage inflation or nominal GDP growth on the other. This is not surprising,
as these variables also generate the smallest welfare losses with αo = 0.2 in Figure 4 and
Figure 5. Also, while strict producer price targeting turned out to generate large losses in
subsection 4.1, the presence of interest rate inertia removes the majority of these losses. In
contrast to ΠdefO , the optimized rule actually places a high weight on Πpj . This is true for
all combinations involving producer prices. Thus, one should not conclude that producer
price targeting in general is inferior to other targets in the model.
Figure 6 plots impulse responses following an oil price shock for two of the rules in
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to oil shocks – Optimized Taylor rules
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Note: Impulse responses to an innovation in εo (one standard deviation) under different flexible targeting
rules. See Figure 1.
Table 5, in addition to Ramsey optimal responses. The first Taylor rule is the one targeting
CPI inflation and nominal GDP growth. These variables are conventional targets in many
central banks. This rule also does well in minimizing the welfare losses. The second rule
is the one targeting the exchange rate and the price impulse from the oil sector. This rule
performs worst of those considered in Table 5. The difference between the two stems from
the interest rate path – the second rule generates a muted response the first periods (due
to nominal the exchange rate appreciation), but then takes off for a prolonged time. In the
first periods after the shock, this leads to more hours worked and a higher consumption
level. The gain is lower wage inflation. However, things turn around after some periods,
and it takes a long time before wage inflation settles down. The CPI-GDP target on the
other hand is able to track optimal policy reasonably well, although it tends to overshoot
Ramsey optimal wage inflation.
5 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In this section I analyze how robust the findings are to alternative calibration choices and
modeling assumptions. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 6. The first
column in the table presents the welfare level associated with Ramsey optimal monetary
policy. The remaining columns show the welfare losses (in %) of deviating from optimal
policy. To save space, I restrict attention to a set of simple Taylor rules identical to those
analyzed in subsection 4.2. The response coefficient ρz is set to 1.5, a number located
in a fairly flat region of the parameter space for most targets (see Figure 4-Figure 5). To
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Table 6: Welfare under alternative model specifications
Ramsey Πc Πp Πw ∆E ∆GDPn ΠdefO
Panel A – Benchmark model
-30.34 -1.46 -1.46 -0.50 -5.60 -0.85 -12.06
Panel B – Alternative specifications
ϕ = 3 -22.97 -2.54 -2.55 -1.06 -9.25 -1.58 -23.14
φj = 0 -30.33 -0.87 -0.60 -0.41 -4.84 -0.78 -10.54
αj = α
F
j = 1 -30.44 -2.40 -2.33 -0.84 -7.09 -1.36 -15.93
η = 2 -30.33 -1.21 -1.09 -0.33 -5.09 -2.08 -9.71
φo = 0 -29.71 -1.42 -1.37 -0.49 -5.60 -0.25 -53.25
Coordination -30.27 -1.75 -1.49 -0.51 -4.69 -0.89 -12.10
PTM -30.34 -1.46 -1.45 -0.50 -5.59 -0.85 -12.08
PTM-LCP -30.34 -1.42 -1.42 -0.51 -5.53 -0.82 -11.91
Note: The first column row reports i) the welfare level under Ramsey optimal policy in the benchmark
model, and ii) welfare losses when monetary authorities follow a simple Taylor rule of the form RtR =(
Zt
Z
)ρz , where ρz = 1.5. The remaining rows show the same under different calibration and modeling
assumptions.
facilitate comparison, the first row reports the welfare level of Ramsey optimal policy in
the benchmark model, as well as welfare losses associated with alternative flexible targets.
The numbers correspond to those in Figure 4-Figure 5 for αo = 0.2 and ρz = 1.5.
The remaining rows show results from the robustness tests. First, I change the sen-
sitivity of labor supply to wage changes. The value of ϕ−1 = 1/3 lies below typical
estimates in the macro literature, but within the range of 0-0.5 found in microeconomic
studies (see e.g. Peterman (2012)). The Frisch elasticity has potentially important effects
on welfare in models with wage rigidity. In particular, a low value implies that an increase
in the wedge between optimal and average wages contributes more to the welfare loss as-
sociated with wage dispersion in equation (39). The results show that welfare is indeed
reduced more under alternative rules with this calibration. However, the ranking across
policies is unchanged.16
Second, I abstract from trade between firms in the non-oil economy by setting φj = 0.
Under this scenario the model collapses to a standard multi-sector, small open economy
model. While welfare associated with Ramsey optimal policy is nearly unchanged, we see
that the losses from alternative rules are smaller. This is particularly true for PPI targeting,
which is ranked above CPI targeting under this calibration.
Third, I report results when the open economy dimension of the model is abstracted
from. That is, I assume that the only link between the SOE and the ROW is the oil sector.
One can think of this as the special case with complete home bias in both economies, i.e.
16The high level of welfare under Ramsey optimal policy comes about from the non-stochastic steady
state solution, which reduces the scaling parameter χN when ϕ rises.
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αj = α
F
j = 1. All policies produce larger welfare losses under this scenario, even though
the non-stochastic steady state welfare level is unchanged. One reason might be that
second order gains of exchange rate volatility on welfare are removed when the economy
is closed, see De Paoli (2009) for a detailed analysis. Still, the welfare ranking of different
policies is similar to the benchmark case.
Fourth, I increase the substitution elasticity between domestic and foreign goods. The
literature has still not settled on a value for this parameter. Values used in DSGE models
typically span from about 0.3 to 2, and microeconomic estimates lie even higher. I report
results when η = 2. Welfare rankings are as before, except for relatively larger losses
associated with the nominal GDP growth target.
Fifth, I shut down the direct channel between domestic non-oil firms and the oil sector.
This is done by assuming that labor and land (Q) constitutes all non-oil inputs used in
oil production. Compared to the benchmark case, this leads to smaller welfare losses
of targeting GDP growth, and substantially larger welfare losses associated with the oil
impulse deflator. The intuition for the latter result is found in labor markets. When φo = 0,
the price impulse deflator collapses to ΠdefO,t = ΠwO,t, i.e. the nominal wage inflation of
oil workers. Targeting this variable leads to excessive fluctuations in hours worked, which
spill over to labor markets in the non-oil economy.
Next, I investigate alternative modeling assumptions. First I change the design of
foreign policy. So far, I have abstracted from the question of optimal policy in the rest of
the world. How do the results change if foreign monetary authorities follow an optimal
policy rule as well? To shed light on this question, I make the assumption that foreign and
domestic monetary authorities engage in policy cooperation in order to maximize welfare
– both in the SOE and in the ROW. This analysis follows along the lines of Benigno and
Benigno (2006). The cooperation problem can be formalized as follows:
maxWCt subject to EtF (Yt+1,Yt,Yt−1, et) = 0,
where
WCt ≡ ςWt + (1− ς)WFt
denotes the weighted sum of expected lifetime utility in the SOE and the ROW. As be-
fore, the weight ς measures the relative size of the SOE, while F is the system of (private
agents’) equilibrium conditions in both economies. et is the vector of structural shocks.
WFt denotes the ROW equivalent to equation (39). Note that the coordination problem
described above is equivalent to a problem faced by one “global” Ramsey-planner that
attempts to maximize world welfare. To solve the maximization problem, I equip the co-
operative planners with two instruments – the nominal interest rate at home and abroad.
The solution procedure is as before.17 Results are reported in sixth row in Table 6. Com-
pared to the benchmark case, we see that Ramsey optimal welfare is higher in the SOE
with international policy cooperation. Gains from cooperation are consistent with the
findings by Benigno and Benigno (2006) in a two-country model without oil and interme-
diate goods. Columns 2-7 report the welfare losses associated with alternative targeting
17In the limit as ς → 0, the coordination problem collapses to the Ramsey problem of the ROW. But
this problem totally neglects the impact of domestic interest rates on welfare in the SOE, implying an
indeterminate solution. Thus, for numerical reasons, I set ς to a small, but positive number. Results for
welfare in the ROW are identical if I instead maximizesWFt only.
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rules in the SOE, maintaining the assumption that policy is Ramsey-optimal in the ROW.
Interestingly, most of the welfare losses are similar to those in the benchmark model, ex-
cept for a slightly higher loss in the case of CPI targeting. Thus, the analysis seems to be
robust to the choice of Ramsey-optimality in the ROW.
Finally, I change the assumptions regarding the pricing behavior of firms. In the
benchmark model, it is assumed that non-oil firms charge the same price in all markets,
including export markets and the oil supply chain. The latter assumption is relaxed next,
where I allow domestic firms to price discriminate between non-oil buyers and the oil sec-
tor firm. This is referred to in the literature as pricing to market (PTM) behavior. Pricing
to the oil market is obtained by substituting equations (29) and (35) with the following:
Zj,tM
φj
j,tN
1−φj
j,t − Φj =
(
XHj,t +X
F
Hj,t
)
Vpj,t +MjO,tV
o
pj,t
GDP j,t = PrHj,t
(
XHj,t +X
F
Hj,t
)
+ P orHj,tMjO,t − Pmrj,tMj,t
In addition, we get price inflation and corresponding price dispersion terms that are spe-
cific to the inputs purchased by the oil sector. Optimal new prices specific to MjO,t are
found from a system similar to (14)-(16), while P orHj,t is determined as in equation (17).
The spread between PrHj,t and P orHj,t is in general determined by differences in non-oil
demand and demand from the oil sector. Results with PTM in the oil sector are shown
in Table 6. We see that the welfare results are almost identical to those obtained in the
benchmark model without PTM.
The last robustness test is to also model PTM of export goods. In particular, I allow
domestic firms to price discriminate between domestic and foreign buyers. I also make the
assumption that exports from the SOE are priced in the currency of buyers, so-called local
currency pricing (LCP). LCP can be motivated by the observation that most export goods
in small open economies are priced in foreign currency (Gopinath, Itskhoki, and Rigobon,
2010). I refer to the combination of active export price discrimination and local currency
pricing as PTM-LCP. Under PTM-LCP, the export prices deviate from local producer
prices because of i) asymmetric market conditions between the SOE and the ROW, and ii)
exchange rate movements which produce a spread between the two. PTM-LCP implies
that we have to substitute equations (29) and (35) with the following:
Zj,tM
φj
j,tN
1−φj
j,t − Φj = XHj,tVpj,t +XFHj,tV FHpj,t +MjO,tV opj,t
GDP j,t = PrHj,tXHj,t + P
F
rHj,tX
F
Hj,t + P
o
rHj,tMjO,t − Pmrj,tMj,t
As before we get price inflation and corresponding price dispersion terms that are specific
to the export markets. Results with PTM-LCP are shown in the last row in Table 6. Again,
we see that the implications are minor compared with the benchmark model. There are
some small gains associated with all alternative rules except wage targeting, but they are
negligible compared with the welfare differences across different targets. In total, I do not
find that assumptions regarding the pricing behavior of firms matter for the results.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a small open economy with oil exports.
I identify the way in which a social planner sets the interest rate to maximize welfare,
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and ask how the presence of an oil sector affects optimal policy. Several results are pro-
vided: First, because of wage stickiness in labor markets, Ramsey optimal policy assigns
a high weight to nominal wage stability. Such stability is accomplished by an aggres-
sive increase (decrease) in nominal interest rates when the marginal rate of substitution
lies above (below) the real wage. Second, the properties of optimal policy are not turned
around because of spillover from the oil sector (except from parts of the parameter space
close to the indeterminacy region). The supply chain represents a new source of macroe-
conomic fluctuations in the economy, but it does not change the importance of wage sta-
bility. Third, policies aimed at stabilizing price and wage impulses from the oil sector can
be disastrous. This conclusion is backed up by two simple observations: If one succeeds
in stabilizing oil sector wages, or the price on intermediate oil inputs, then this comes
at the cost of shutting down the automatic stabilization mechanisms embedded in these
variables. When demand for inputs in the oil sector goes up, prices and wages should
increase in order to prevent excessive tightening of resource constraints in the non-oil
economy. Otherwise, one can get enormous movements in non-oil wages and prices –
movements that are unwarranted from a welfare perspective. The second observation that
speaks against such a policy, is the fact that nominal interest rates would have to undertake
drastic swings in order to achieve stability of the target variable.
Although the model presented here provides a step forward for our understanding
of macroeconomic dynamics in oil exporting economies, it comes with important limi-
tations. One is the observation that oil production is relatively intensive in capital. To
the extent that investment goods used to accumulate capital are produced in the non-oil
economy, this will certainly add to the impulses through the supply chain. Also, I have
restricted the study to the spillover from oil to domestic factor markets. Oil revenues,
the flip-side of oil sector activity, are abstracted from. How does this affect the results?
In most oil exporting economies, the oil revenues accrue to the government. Suppose
these are spent on an as-you-go basis. If an increase in revenues leads to an increase in
public spending, then I expect that impulse responses in Figure 1 are amplified. That is,
higher non-oil demand (due to public spending) would further increase domestic prices
and real interest rates, causing stronger pressure on labor as well as additional exchange
rate appreciation. On the contrary, non-oil responses might be smaller if fiscal spending is
countercyclical. A related concern to public spending is the way in which the tax system
is formed. I leave the question of optimal fiscal policy for future research, although Hevia
and Nicolini (2013) provide insights along these lines. Finally, I have abstracted from
concerns regarding the zero lower bound. Indeed, many of the policies under consider-
ation in this paper generates large movements in the nominal interest rate, implying that
the zero lower bound might bind quite often. However, dealing with this issue requires
a considerably more complex framework, involving non-linear, global approximation al-
gorithms (see e.g. Adam and Billi (2006) and Nakov (2008)). Thus, I see this as a
preliminary, but productive step towards understanding monetary policy trade-offs in oil
exporting economies.
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APPENDIX
A THE NON-STOCHASTIC STEADY STATE
In this appendix, I derive an analytical solution for the non-stochastic steady state system
of the SOE. I restrict attention to an equilibrium with relative prices equal to unity, i.e.
PHrj = PFrj = P
F
rj = Pro = S = 1. I also restrict attention the benchmark model
without PTM or PTM-LCP (see section 5). The solution for these alternative models is
found following a similar procedure as the one below. A few remarks about the steady
state: First, I cannot follow common practice and normalize steady state TFP to unity,
because one degree of freedom has already been used by normalizing the measure of
firms in each sector to unity. Thus, Zj will be part of the steady state solution. Second,
to control the size of the oil sector relative to aggregate GDP, I introduce a free parameter
γo. This implies that I have to solve for steady state TFP in the oil sector as well. Third,
to control import and export shares in each non-oil sector, I introduce the free parameters
γimj and γ
ex
j . This means I have to solve for αj and α
F
j . Finally, I restrict steady state
wages and hours per worker to be the same across sectors. This removes the incentive
to change sectoral working occupation (implying no-arbitrage in the labor markets), but
implies that I have to solve for the fractions of employed workers in each sector, µj and
µo.
A.1 THE REST OF THE WORLD (CLOSED ECONOMY)
The ROW has a steady state solution similar to the SOE, except that the exports, imports
and oil production is negligible. The steady state for the ROW can be found using the
same recursive procedure as showed below for the SOE.
A.2 THE SMALL OPEN ECONOMY
Here I solve for the non-stochastic steady state in the SOE, taking as input the i) vector
of structural parameters ii) the steady state CPI inflation rate Πc, and iii) the steady state
solution for the ROW. The nominal interest rate is found from (3):
R =
Πc
β
(A.1)
Marginal utility of aggregate consumption is found from (4):
Λ = ΛF (A.2)
Aggregate consumption is found from (2):
C = Λ−1 (A.3)
Consumption in sector j from (1):
CM = ξC, CS = (1− ξ)C (A.4)
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Next, I set out to derive sector level output. A few observation are needed: First, the
definition of GDP in sector j implies that GDP and gross output are linked by the identity
GDPj = Y
d
j − Mj = (1− φj)Y dj , implying that aggregate non-oil GDP is GDP =∑
j=M,S (1− φj)Y dj . Oil GDP on the other hand can be writtenGDPO = (1− αoφo)YO.
Second, total absorption of sector j-goods, including demand from the oil sector, is
Y dHj + Y
d
Fj = Cj +XjM +XjS +XjO.
Using the expression for GDPj , we can write the left hand side as
Y dHj + Y
d
Fj = Y
d
j − Y d
F
Hj + Y
d
Fj
= Y dj − γexj (1− φj)Y dj + γimj (1− φj)Y dj ,
where γexj and γ
im
j are the export and import shares of GDP in sector j. The right hand
side of the expression above can be written (see below)
Cj +XjM +XjS +XjO = Cj + ζjMφMY
d
M + ζjSφSY
d
S + ζjOφoαoYO
= Cj +
∑
l=M,S
[
ζjlφl +
ζjOφoαoγo
(1− φoαo) (1− γo) (1− φl)
]
Y dl ,
where γo is oil share in total GDP in the economy. Thus, by combining the left hand side
and the right hand side, we can express the production network in the SOE in compact
form:
Ψ′NXY = C + ΨY
The output vector is denoted by Y =
[
Y dM , Y
d
S
]′, and the consumption vector by C =
[CM , CS]
′. The j’th element in ΨNX is
ΨNX (j) = 1−
(
γexj − γimj
)
(1− φj) ,
while the (j, l)’th element of the matrix Ψ is equal to
Ψ (j, l) = ζjlφl +
ζjOφoαoγo
(1− φoαo) (1− γo) (1− φl) .
The solution for Y dj follows:
Y = Ψ˜C (A.5)
Ψ˜ = [1×Ψ′NX −Ψ]−1 is referred to as the steady state influence matrix. Next, optimal
new price in sector j is found from (17):
P¯rHj =
 1− θpj
1− θpjΠ
1
p
c
p (A.6)
Real marginal costs in sector j is found from (14):
RMCj =
1− βθpjΠ
1+p
p
c
1− βθpjΠ
1
p
c
P¯rHj
1 + p
(A.7)
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Note that equation (A.7) collapses to RMCj = 11+p in the special case with Πc = 1. The
variables Gj and Hj that determine optimal new prices in sector j are found from (15)
and (16):
Gj =
ΛY dj RMCj
1− βθpjΠ
1+p
p
c
(A.8)
Hj =
ΛY dj P¯rHj
1− βθpjΠ
1
p
c
(A.9)
Price dispersion in sector j is found from (30):
Vpj =
1− θpj
1− θpjΠ
1+p
p
c
P¯
− 1+p
p
rHj (A.10)
Gross output in sector j is found from (29):
Yj = Y
d
j Vpj (A.11)
Next I solve for the fixed production cost Φj . The optimality conditions for firm j with
respect to factors of production are as follows:
RMCjφj (Yj (f) + Φj) = P
x
rjXj (f)
RMCj (1− φj) (Yj (f) + Φj) = ΩNj (f)
Thus, we can write the individual firm’s profit as
Dj (f) = PrHj (f)Yj (f)− P xrjXj (f)− ΩNj (f)
= PrHj (f)Yj (f)−RMCj (Yj (f) + Φj) .
Taking the sum over all firms and imposing zero profit in the aggregate, we get∫ 1
0
[PrHj (f)Yj (f)−RMCj (Yj (f) + Φj)] df = Y dj −RMCj
(
Y dj Vpj + Φj
)
= 0,
where
∫ 1
0
PrHj (f)Yj (f) df = PrHjY
d
j and Yj ≡
∫ 1
0
Yj (f) df = Y
d
j Vpj . Solving the
expression above for Φj:
Φj =
(
1
RMCj
− Vpj
)
Y dj (A.12)
The real wage is found from aggregate labor market income Ω (NM +NS +NO) and the
sector specific optimality conditions with respect to labor demand (see below):
Ω =
(
1 + αoγo(1−φo)
1−αoφo
)∑
j=M,S (1− φj)Y dj
L
(A.13)
37
TFP in sector j is found from (13):
Zj =
1
RMCj
(
1
φj
)φj ( Ω
1− φj
)1−φj
(A.14)
Material and labor demand in sector j is found from (12):
Xj = φjY
d
j (A.15)
Nj = (1− φj)
Y dj
Ω
(A.16)
Material input delivered to sector j from sector l is found from (11):
XMj = ζjXj, XSj = (1− ζj)Xj (A.17)
Labor force share in sector j is found from (5):
µj =
Nj
L
(A.18)
Imports in sector j:
Y dFj = γ
im
j (1− φj)Y dj (A.19)
Exports in sector j:
Y d
F
Hj = γ
ex
j (1− φj)Y dj (A.20)
Domestically produced local goods in sector j:
Y dHj = Y
d
j − Y d
F
Hj (A.21)
Home bias in sector j:
αj =
Y dHj
Y dHj + Y
d
Fj
(A.22)
Home bias in the ROW’s sector j, where Y dFj is sectoral demand in the ROW:
αFj = 1−
Y d
F
Hj
Y d
F
j
(A.23)
The normalizing constant in the utility function is found from (8):
χN =
Ω
CLϕ (1 + w)
(A.24)
Constant real wage in all sectors requires that Πw = Πc. Optimal new real wage in sector
j is found from (9):
Ω¯j =
 1− θwj
Ω−
1
w − θwj
(
Ω
Πc
)− 1
w

w
(A.25)
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The variables Dj and Ej that determine optimal new wages in sector j are found from (7)
and (8):
Dj =
Ω¯
− 1
w
j ΛΩ
1+w
w L
(1 + w)
(
1− βθwjΠ
1
w
c
) (A.26)
Ej = χN
L1+ϕ(
Ω¯j
Ω
) 1+w
w
(1+ϕ)
(
1− βθwjΠ
1+w
w
(1+ϕ)
c
) (A.27)
Wage dispersion in sector j is found from (26):
Vwj = µj
(1− θwj)
(
Ω¯j
Ω
)− 1+w
w
1− θwjΠ
1+w
w
c
(A.28)
Finally, we arrive at the oil sector. Gross oil output is found from (22):
YO =
γo
(1− γo) (1− αoφo)
∑
j=M,S
(1− φj)Y dj (A.29)
Land (with RqO normalized to unity):
QO = (1− αo)YO (A.30)
The remaining oil sector variables are found in the same way as corresponding non-oil
variables. Finally, the variables relevant for welfare are summarized as follows:
Vuj = µj
(1− θwj)
(
Ω¯j
Ω
)− 1+w
w
(1+ϕ)
1− θwjΠ
1+w
w
(1+ϕ)
c
(A.31)
VuO = µO
(1− θwO)
(
Ω¯O
Ω
)− 1+w
w
(1+ϕ)
1− θwOΠ
1+w
w
(1+ϕ)
c
(A.32)
W = 1
1− β
[
ln (C)− χN L
1+ϕ (VuM + VuS + VuO)
1 + ϕ
]
(A.33)
Note that the sum of dispersion terms in the welfare function collapses to µM +µS+µO =
1 if Πc = 1. This completes the description of the non-stochastic steady state.
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B ADDITIONAL TABLES
Table B.1: Business cycle statistics – Sector level
Moments Variance decomposition
σx ρx,y εm εs ε
F
m ε
F
s εo
Panel A – Manufacturing sector under Taylor rule
GDP 3.38 0.96 66.32 1.34 5.17 0.05 27.13
Consumption 4.21 0.63 77.39 0.51 19.44 0.18 2.48
Hours 2.82 -0.39 81.65 0.34 6.81 0.19 11.00
Trade balance 0.96 -0.21 23.79 3.80 27.46 4.22 40.73
Inflation 2.38 -0.51 71.97 0.10 27.72 0.14 0.07
Wage inflation 0.18 -0.48 76.01 5.23 13.64 0.40 4.73
Real wages 1.53 0.75 65.74 7.10 23.54 0.50 3.11
Terms of trade 7.44 -0.22 49.10 0.24 49.08 0.24 1.33
Panel B – Manufacturing sector under Ramsey policy
GDP 4.07 0.97 77.15 7.04 4.98 0.05 10.78
Consumption 5.08 0.80 75.46 3.27 17.38 0.17 3.72
Hours 1.98 -0.45 74.05 14.51 2.79 0.06 8.59
Trade balance 0.93 -0.03 22.04 2.69 29.92 4.59 40.76
Inflation 2.18 -0.42 66.13 2.55 30.22 0.11 0.99
Wage inflation 0.04 -0.23 36.71 56.16 0.73 0.00 6.40
Real wages 1.38 0.85 62.31 7.05 24.45 0.48 5.71
Terms of trade 7.99 -0.39 58.77 2.11 36.46 0.15 2.51
Panel C – Service sector under Taylor rule
GDP 2.56 0.98 33.60 10.49 15.88 0.20 39.82
Consumption 1.58 0.19 31.25 21.13 16.80 0.47 30.36
Hours 1.90 0.10 19.81 44.77 8.12 0.25 27.05
Trade balance 0.16 -0.19 15.12 13.00 18.48 13.28 40.13
Inflation 0.26 -0.47 40.39 39.79 15.56 2.67 1.59
Wage inflation 0.16 -0.36 67.98 9.93 15.10 0.49 6.51
Real wages 1.65 0.73 71.34 3.33 21.37 0.45 3.51
Terms of trade 2.01 0.11 21.47 16.65 21.86 16.78 23.24
Panel D – Service sector under Ramsey policy
GDP 3.25 0.99 48.26 22.82 13.97 0.25 14.70
Consumption 2.58 0.57 34.58 34.75 4.27 0.37 26.03
Hours 0.94 0.43 31.65 26.00 1.55 0.02 40.79
Trade balance 0.15 -0.07 9.20 8.25 27.08 16.21 39.26
Inflation 0.20 -0.16 37.43 34.43 13.59 2.85 11.70
Wage inflation 0.03 0.61 78.27 2.08 5.06 0.17 14.43
Real wages 1.52 0.83 68.98 3.59 21.62 0.43 5.38
Terms of trade 3.11 -0.40 24.88 29.78 18.05 5.25 22.04
Note: σx is the standard deviation of variable x (in %), ρx,y is the correlation with GDP. The
remaining columns report the variance decomposition of each variable (in %).
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